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Marketing
The Compromise Effect denotes the tendency to choose the intermediate ob-
ject rather than the extreme object in a choice set. The Attraction Effect denotes
the tendency to choose the object which has a worse alternative according to the
desirable attributes in the choice set. Despite the validity and importance of this
phenomenon it is neglected to incorporate both the Compromise and Attraction
Effects in formal choice models and to test whether such models outperform the
standard value maximization model. Employing a survey on USB’s in this article,
we suggest that (1) both the Compromise and Attraction Effects are valid (2) The
violation of WARP is possible, (3) none of the models outperform others while there
are cases that standard value maximization outperforms others.
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Uzlas¸ım Etkisi, Cazibe Etkisi, Deneysel Ekonomi, Davranıs¸sal Pazarlama
Uzlas¸ım etkisi, uc¸ o¨zellikler tas¸ıyan objelerdense orta o¨zellikleri tas¸ıyan objeleri
sec¸meye eg˘ilimi ifade eder. Cazibe etkisiyse kendinden her yo¨nu¨yle ko¨tu¨ bir alter-
natifi bulunan objeyi sec¸meye yo¨nelik eg˘ilimi ifade eder. Bu iki etkinin de o¨nemi ve
gec¸erlilig˘ine kars¸ın, bunlar formel sec¸im modelleriyle ilis¸kilendirip, standart deg˘er
maksimizasyonu modeline u¨stu¨n gelip gelmedig˘i test edilmemis¸tir. Flash bellekler
u¨zerine bir anket du¨zenleyerek, (1) bu iki etkinin gec¸erlilig˘ini, (2) WARP’ı ihlale
sebep olabileceklerini ve (3) hic¸ bir sec¸im modelinin her durumda standart deg˘er
maksimizasyonuna u¨stu¨n gelmedig˘ini go¨sterdik.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Compromise and Attraction Effects
Suppose you are at a restaurant, and looking at the menu. The tastes of the meals
are in the same order as the prices as Figure 1: Deli Cious is the most delicious one,
Ave Rage is the fairly tasteful one and Dis Taste Ful is the most tasteless one. The
prices related to these meals are also as shown in the menu. Which one would be
your choice? I am sure that one encounters this kind of choice schemes many times
in daily life, Kivetz, Netzer and Srinivasan (2004) show that most people choose
the one which is not that tasteless and expensive. Using survey data they prove
statistically the existence of this tendency. This tendency also is one of the subjects
of this study and discussed in details later on.
Now think about another scenario with the same meals but different prices as
shown in Figure 2. In this case, the fairly tasteful one is also the most expensive
one. Which one would be your choice? Marketing research has shown that people
tend to choose the most delicious one for this particular case.
These two hypothetical cases are related to two phenomena in economics Com-
promise and Attraction effects, which have drawn the attention of economists and
marketing experts. Assuming an environment where objects differ only in two at-
tributes, we can roughly say that the Compromise Effect is about the inclination of
people choosing the object which is not extreme in terms of either attribute. The
Attraction Effect implies if an object has an alternative which is worse than another
according to the both attributes, an inclination of people choosing that better ob-
ject. In our example these the two attributes are affordability and taste (the second
attribute).
To have a better insight, look at Figure 3. The left side of Figure 3 represents
the Menu de Compromise while the right side represents Menu de Attraction. In
the figure, choice sets consist of three objects, and those objects differ only in these
attributes. As the value of the attributes increase, they become more valuable.
Because of these effects above, yellow ones are more likely to be chosen: Firstly,
look at the graph of the Compromise Effect, left side of Figure 3. The yellow one
here is Ave Rage because the compromise effect implies the one which is not extreme
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tends to be chosen. Secondly, look at the graph of the Attraction Effect, right side
of Figure 3. The yellow one here is Deli Cious because it is better than Ave Rage
in every attribute.
1.2 The Aim of this Study
Our aim is twofold. First, after observing the choices of the subjects with an exper-
iment, we try to check the existence of these effects. Second, we calibrate different
models using statistical tools and compare them in terms of goodness of fit. These
models are probability functions which assign a probability of being chosen to each
element in a choice set for each player.
There are of course people who do not exhibit these effects in their choice. Ad-
ditionally, it is possible to observe that one of these effects in the choices of some
individuals, while it seems the other effect has not a significant role in their decisions.
Our aim here is, specifically, detecting the general tendency, not the individual ten-
dencies. The Model section clarifies what general tendency means in our context in
detail. But in the nutshell, we measure the general tendency as the marginal increase
in the percent of people choosing one object when these effects are in question.
There are some models which try to explain this general tendency. These models,
using some data about the choices of people from the choice sets, give us the extent
of these effects for any case, for the population in general. This is, one of such
models would say that when these alternatives considered, some percent of people
would choose the first alternative, some other percent of people would choose the
second alternative... Next, among the models which claim to explain these effects,
we choose the most explaining one for some widely-used criteria. The details about
the data and the models can be found in Data Analysis part.
1.3 Literature Review
Compromise and Attraction effects have drawn the attention of researchers from
different disciplines such as economics, political science and marketing. While there
are many applied studies which try to detect and measure these effects, there are
also theoretical studies which supply frameworks accounting for only one of them
or both of them. Those studies study different domains and choices, such as among
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political parties or among investment portfolios.
One example of empirical studies on the Compromise Effect is about investment
portfolio choices which are studied by Benartzi and Thaler (2002). Their study is
on a two-step survey. First, subjects choose an investment decision from a set which
has many alternatives. Second, they are asked whether or not they want to switch
another investment portfolio which is the mean of all participants. The result is
that a significant amount of participants choose to switch to the mean portfolio.
They discuss that the related context effect, it is Compromise effect here, may be
the reason to this behavior. There are other studies on a wide range of domains
and cases. For instance, Simonson and Nowlis(2000) on the other hand evaluate the
Compromise Effect as a form of consideration set effects using ice- cream experiment,
and also Lehmann and Pan(1994) conducted an experiment on mouthwashes.
Compromise Effect and Attraction Effects is demonstrated first by Simonson.
Simonson (1989), defines them in a two-step experimentation. Consider a case
in which agents are indifferent in two objects which differ only in two attributes.
Introduction of an object which is the best one in one attribute ant the worst one
in the other attribute makes the object which is now the median according to either
attributes more attractive to the agents. This is his definition of the Compromise
Effect. For the Attraction Effect the object introduced is the median according
to one attribute while the worst according to other attribute. The introduction of
such object makes the object, which Pareto dominates the introduced object, more
attractive to the agents.
On the other hand, Simonson and Tversky (1992) come with another definition
for Compromise Effect which is more suitable to run experiments. For this reason
we use their definition of Compromise Effect. Applying the same logic as theirs we
defined the Attraction Effect. Definitions can be found in Model part.
It is possible to find applied studies on the Attraction Effect in many contexts.
One interesting example is studied by Pan, O’Curry and Pitts (1995) on decisions
from political parties. Because of the nature of these effects it is hard to create
a real world choice setting to prove their existence. For this reason most of the
empirical studies are created using hypothetical choice sets. Pan, O’Curry and
Pitts have found real world data which is suitable to observe the existence of the
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Attraction Effect. Their study indicates that the Attraction Effect is valid in this
real world context as well. Beside this example there are other studies concerning
the Attraction Effect such as Dhar and Simonson (2003), which is the effect of no-
choice option on the Attraction Effect and another study is created by Simonson
(1989) to verify the existence of these effects.
In addition to these empirical evidence supporting these effects, however there are
attempts to explain these effects in a theoretical framework. Clippel and Eliaz (2010)
analyze the decision making process such that objects differ only in two attributes.
They model an intra-personal bargaining problem among different selves. They
apply to this intra-personal bargaining problem the fallback bargaining. Brams and
Kilgour (1998) defined this rule as a bargaining prodecure under which bargaining
starts with parties revealing their preference ranking over all alternatives in the
choice set. When these parties are the inner selves of an agent such that each self
cares only one attribute, Clippel and Eliaz (2010) show that the fallback bargaining
outcomes consistently exhibit both Attraction and Compromise Effects. In the
existence of k alternatives their procedure is as follows:
1- If there is an alternative which is ranked as the first according to two criteria
then choose that alternative. Else pass to the next step.
2- If there is an alternative which is ranked as the first or the second according
to two criteria then choose that alternative. Else pass to the next step.
...
k-If there is an alternative which is ranked as the first or the second... or the kth
according to two criteria then choose that alternative.
Let us check if it works for Figure 3. For the graph on the left side there is not
an alternative which is ranked as the first according to two criteria. On the other
hand the yellow one is ranked as the second according to those criteria while others
ranked as whether the first and the third. So we stop at the second step and choose
the yellow one. For the graph on the right side there is not an alternative which is
ranked as the first according to two criteria. However, the yellow one is ranked as
the first or the second so we stop at the second step and choose the yellow one. The
graph on the left was representing the Compromise Effect while the right one was for
the Attraction Effect and their outcomes are coincided with the fallback bargaining
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procedure. The same procedure, under the name of Unanimity Compromise is
studied and is shown that it is the only bargaining. rule which satisfies some basic
properties by Kibris, Sertel (2006) The same rule under the name of “Kant-Rawls
Social Compromise” is previously proposed by Sertel and Hurwitz (1997)
Apart from these studies, there is another study by Kivetz, Netzer and Srinivasan
(2004) which should be touched upon because it constitutes the base for our study;
we use the same framework as theirs. In an environment in which the alternatives
differ only in two desirable attributes, they verify the existence of the Compromise
Effect. After verifying the existence, they calibrate and compare different models
for capturing this effect. These models assign probability of being chosen to each
object in a choice set by each agent. And all these models are convex in nature.
Some questions arise. First, even though there are two important framework
effects, this study is only on Compromise Effect. Maybe the same application could
be executed on the Attraction Effect too. Second, all models they use were convex
in nature. For this reason, any result in the favor of Compromise Effect was not
an unforeseen result. To what extend these models can be successful in explaining
both these effects at the same time? In this study, we answer these questions: Does
the Attraction Effect also exist? Do these models also as explaining as before for
both of the effects together.
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2 Model
2.1 Compromise and Attraction Effects
The set of agents is N = {i ∈ Z++|n ∈ Z++,i ≤ n}
There are 8 sets of alternatives; each of them contains three objects. We call this
kind of choice sets as trinary choice sets; Each agent choose only one object from
trinary choice sets
1-s1 = {xl, x2, x3}
2-s2 = {x2, x3, x4}
3-s3 = {x3, x4, x5}
4-s4 = {x4, x5, x6}
5-s5 = {x7, x8, x10}
6-s6 = {x8, x9, x10}
7-s7 = {x9, x10, x12}
8-s8 = {xl0, x11, x12}
and S = ∪9i=1si
Additionally, there are two desirable attributes. The objects we consider differ
only in these two attributes, say a1 and a2. For any alternative, say x, the value of
its attributes are shown as, a1(x) and a2(x).
In the traditional framework, we mention about either a choice function or a
choice correspondence. But in this framework we consider the choice function as a
probability function defined on a given choice set. This probability function is also
the measure of agent’s tendency for any object. We call this measure as P (y >
z|x, y, z).It is the number of the people who choose y divided by the number of the
people who choose either y or z, in the existence of x in the choice set. We call
this probability as y’s relavite probability to z in the set of {x,y,z}. For instance
say that in a sample of 40 people; 5, 10, 25 people choose x,y,z respectively. Then
P (y > z|x, y, z) is 10/(10 + 25) = 0.28571
Using this notation, we can define both the Compromise and Attraction Effects:
6
Definition 1 Compromise Effect: ∀ x, y, z, t ∈ S such that, a1(x) > a1(y) >
a1(z) > a1(t) and, a2(x) < a2(y) < a2(z) < a2(t), then P (y > z|x, y, z) > P (y >
z|y, z, t)
In words, assume a case that four objects are ordered reversely according to two
attributes. There are two choice sets and the first one includes the first three objects
and the second one includes the last three objects according to the first alternative.
The Compromise Effect implies the second object’s relative probability to the third
object in the first set is larger than in the second set.
For instance, according to Figure 4, Compromise Effect implies that, P (x2 >
x3|x1, x2, x3) > P (x2 > x3|x2, x3, x4)
On the other hand, the literature does not contain a definition of the Attraction
Effect for this setting .For this reason we create a new one.
Definition 2 Attraction Effect:∀ x, y, z, t ∈ S such that, a1(y) > a1(x) >
a1(z) > a1(t) and, a2(x) < a2(y) < a2(t) < a2(z) then P (y > z|x, y, z) > P (y >
z|y, z, t)
In words, assume a case in which there are two incomparable objectss and each
has their own Pareto better alternatives, each of those Pareto better objects Pareto
dominate only one other object. The Attraction Effect implies, the first Pareto
better option’s relative probability to the second Pareto better object is higher
when the choice set includes the dominated object of the first Pareto better object.
For instance, according to Figure 4, Attraction Effect implies that, P (x8 >
x10|x7, x8, x10) > P (x8 > x10|x8, x9, x10)
2.2 WARP
After introducing these effects, we show that these effects may cause irrational
choices. In fact, regular violations of rationality are the important reasons why
economists are curious about these effects.
Additionally, the literature does not contain a definition of WARP for this setting
.For this reason we create a new one.
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Definition 3 WARP:∀ x, y, z, t ∈ S for defined probabilities, if P (y > z|x, y, z) >
P (z > y|x, y, z) then P (y > z|y, z, t) > P (z > y|y, z, t).
In words, WARP implies the tendency for choosing some object does not change
its direction when the choice set changes.
Considering this new version of WARP, in some cases Compromise and Attrac-
tion Effects may lead to its violations. Below are some samples.
Example 1 For the Compromise Effect, using Figure 4, say that from the sets of
{1,2,3} and {2,3,4} the number of the people who prefer these alternatives are
(10,50,40) and (30,60,10) respectively. In this case the Compromise Effect emerges
with P (x2 > x3|x1, x2, x3) = 50/(50 + 40) > 30/(30 + 60) = P (x2 > x3|x2, x3, x4).
On the other hand P (x2 > x3|x1, x2, x3) = 50/(50 + 40) > 40/(50 + 40) = P (x3 >
x2|x1, x2, x3) but P (x2 > x3|x2, x3, x4) = 30/(30 + 60) < 60/(30 + 60) = P (x3 >
x2|x2, x3, x4). So there are choice profiles which exhibit Compromise Effect and thus
result in violations of WARP.
Example 2 For the Attraction Effect, again using Figure 4, say that from sets of
{7,8,10} and {8,10,9} the number of the people who prefer these alternatives are
(10,70,20) and (30,60,10) respectively. In this case the Attraction Effect emerges
with P (x8 > x10|x7, x8, x10) = 70/(70+20) > 30/(30+60) = P (x8 > x10|x8, x9, x10).
On the other hand P (x8 > x10|x7, x8, x10) = 70/(70+20) > 20/(70+20) = P (x10 >
x8|x7, x8, x10), but P (x8 > x10|x8, x9, x10) = 30/(30 + 60) < 60/(30 + 60) = P (x10 >
x8|x8, x9, x10). So there are choice profiles which have Attraction Effect in it and
result in violations of WARP.
2.3 Models for Capturing the Effects
We see that both Attraction and Compromise Effects may create violations of WARP
in Example 1 and Example 2. There are a few models which may account for the
Compromise and Attraction Effects. Note that all these models have a probabilistic
nature.
All models are using the concept of partworth. Partworth is how an agent values
an attribute at marginal level. When collecting the data, 1st, 2nd and 5th questions
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are used to construct a data set called partworth. Partworth is a three dimensional
matrix and we denote it as Pi,j,k :The partworth of the level of attribute k of object
j for consumer i. But how do we construct Pi,j,k?
Where vi(k) is the total valuation of agent i for k’th attribute. This is individual
information gathered by surveys.
Definition 4: Pi,j,k = ak(j) ∗ vi(k)
Example 3 Say we try to find P2,3,1. Look at any of those survey papers in
Appendix-1, because the questions are common for partworth it does not mattter
what we choose We take the 2nd person’s survey paper. The specifications of object
3 ( It does not need to be listed in any questions. ) are say 4GB and $35. Because
k=1, we focus on GB attribute; but if it was k=2, then we had to focus on Dollar
attribute. Assume that the point given by 2nd person to the 4 GB in Question 1 is
5 and ”A’dan C’ye gec¸is¸ deg˘erim” in Question 5 is 3. Then P2,3,1 = 5 ∗ 3 = 15.
Note that we do not go deep into the nature of the models; because the models
exist in the literature already, we are just interested the calibration and goodness of
fit.
For some models below MMij is the deterministic component of utility of alterna-
tive j. for person i for model M.
Some other models M s,Mi,j is the deterministic component of utility of object j in
the choice set s for person i and fr model M; s is any element of S, b is the logit
scale parameter and ck is the concavity parameter for attribute k, P
s
i,min,k (P
s
i,max,k)
is the minimum(maximum) partworth among j∈ s for the person i and attribute k;
and Pri(j|s) is the probability which the model assigns for j being chosen from the
choice set s for i’th player.
2.3.1 VMM-Value Maximization Model
PrVMMi (j|s) =
exp(b ∗MVMMi,j )∑
h∈s exp(b ∗MVMMi,h )
where
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MVMMi,j =
∑
k
(Pi,j,k)
b is the parameter to be calibrated.
2.3.2 Global Concavity Model
PrGCMi (j|s) =
exp(b ∗MGCMi,j )∑
h∈s exp(b ∗MGCMi,h )
where
MGCMi,j =
∑
k
(Pi,j,k)
ck
b, ck are the parameters to be calibrated.
2.3.3 CCM-Contextual Concavity Model
PrCCMi (j|s) =
exp(b ∗M s,CCMi,j )∑
h∈S exp(b ∗M s,CCMi,h )
where
b and ck are the parameters of the model.
2.3.4 NCCM-Normalized Contextual Concavity Modell
PrNCCMi (j|s) =
exp(b ∗M s,NCCMi,j )∑
h∈s exp(b ∗M sNCCMi,h )
where
M s,NCCMij =
∑
k
(P si,max,k − P si,min,k)x[(Pi,j,k − P si,min,k)/ (P si,max,k − P si,min,k) ]ck
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3 Data Collection
For collecting data, a survey is used. For examples please see Appendix 1. There are
80 subjects who are sophomore students from Sabanci University and ITU(Istanbul
Technical University) in Turkey. The objects of the survey are USB. The first
reason we chose USB is because it is an object almost all people are familiar with.
Second, it can easily be defined on two attributes because it is relatively a simple
product in terms of technologic features.
Each subject is randomly classified into types of 1, 2, 3, or 4. Each subject
is asked to make a choice from two different choice sets. The sets are assigned to
the types according to the table below. For example, TYPE1 is asked to make a
choice from the SET1 and SET5. These sets are the sets in Figure 4. The choices are
observed using the 3rd and the 4th questions on the survey paper, at the Appendix-1
type/sets SET1 SET2 SET3 SET4 SET5 SET6 SET7 SET8
TYPE1
√
- - -
√
- - -
TYPE2 -
√
- - -
√
- -
TYPE3 - -
√
- - -
√
-
TYPE4 - - -
√
- - -
√
There are five questions on each survey paper. The 3rd and the 4th questions
are for observing the Compromise and Attraction Effects.The 1st, 2nd and the 5th
questions are common among all types. These questions are used to supply required
information for the competing models, which is discussed in Data Analysis part in
detail.
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4 Data Analysis
4.1 Testing the Existence of Compromise and Attraction
Effects
After collecting the data, a table is constructed which shows what percent of subjects
choose one object in the existence of other two objects. Using this data table we
test the significance of the Compromise and Attraction Effects. The test is executed
using a z-test. I now give an example of how we test the Compromise Effect.
The first row is the choice sets, the second row is the number of the subjects who
made a choice from the related choice set, the first column is the different types of
USB’s, the numbers represent the percent of subjects who choose the related USB
from the related choice set, ’-’ means the related USB is not included in the related
choice ret.
SET 1 SET 2 SET 3 SET 4
USB n=41 n=33 n=30 n=23
1 20 - - -
2 55 30 - -
3 25 60 30 -
4 - 10 60 25
5 - - 10 45
6 - - - 30
For instance testing P (x2 > x3|x1, x2, x3) > P (x2 > x3|x2, x3, x4), the Compro-
mise Effect between SET1 and SET2, is a work of testing the difference between
proportions. We demonstrate this next.
We apply the procedure for testing the difference between proportions using z-
test. Assume we have two samples and obtained two proportions p1, p2 out of them
and try to test the hypothesis of p1 ≥ p2 with the alternative hypothesis of p2 > p1.
The procedure is as follows:
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1. We find pooled sample proportion, p. The formula of p is
(p1xn1 + p2xn2)/(n1 + n2)
where n1 and n2 are the sizes of sample 1 and sample 2 respectively.
2. We compute the standard error, SE. The formula of SE is
2
√
px(1− p)x((1/n1) + (1/n2))
3. We find the test statistic, z. The z-statistic is computed as
(p1 − p2)/SE
4. We look at the normal distribution table and calculate the one sided p-value
to finalize the test. If the p value is less than 0.01 then we reject the null
hypothesis.
Now let us apply this procedure for the generic table above to test
P (x2 > x3|x1, x2, x3) > P (x2 > x3|x2, x3, x4)
Example 4 The share of 2 relative to 3 p1=55/(55 + 25) = 0.687 5 for SET 1 and
p2 = 30/(60 + 30) = 0.333 33 for SET 2. The difference is p1 − p2 = 0.354 17 The
z-statistics can be obtained as follow:
1. p= (0.6875x41x0.80) + 0.33333x33x0.90)/(41x0.80 + 33x0.90) = 0.519 20
It is important here to note that our samples are not the n’s in the table, they
are the subjects who play role in calculating p1 and p2
For example, for p1 we should look at the subjects who have chosen 2 or 3.
For this reason the sample size for p1 is 41*(0.55+0.25) = 41*0.80
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2. SE= 2
√
0.519 20x(1− 0.519 20)x((1/(41x0.80)) + (1/(33x0.90))) = 0.126 55
3. z= 0.35417/SE = 2. 798 6 h 2.8
4. P(z<2.8) corresponds at the normal distribution table to 0.9974. Any number
which is greater than 0.01 would be enough to accept the null hypothesis. So
we have a significant Compromise Effect in the object 2 relative to the object
3.
There are 9 hypotheses we test. These are, using Figure 4, for the Compromise Effect
1. P (x2 > x3|x1, x2, x3) > P (x2 > x3|x2, x3, x4),
2. P (x3 > x2|x2, x3, x4) > P (x3 > x2|x1, x2, x3),
3. P (x3 > x4|x2, x3, x4) > P (x3 > x4|x3, x4, x5),
4. P (x4 > x3|x3, x4, x5) > P (x4 > x3|x2, x3, x4),
5. P (x4 > x5|x3, x4, x5) > P (x4 > x5|x4, x5, x6),
6. P (x5 > x4|x4, x5, x6) > P (x5 > x4|x3, x4, x5)
and for the Attraction Effect
1. P (x8 > x10|x7, x8, x10) > P (x8 > x10|x8, x9, x10),
2. P (x10 > x12|x9, x10, x12) > P (x10 > x12|x10, x11, x12),
3. P (x10 > x8|x8, x9, x10) > P (x10 > x8|x7, x8, x10),
4. P (x12 > x10|x10, x11, x12) > P (x12 > x10|x9, x10, x12) .
The number of the hypotheses large because we list each possible cases for Com-
promise and Attraction Effects. For instance for the SET 1 and SET 2 there are
two possible ways which Compromise Effect may exhibit. P (x2 > x3|x1, x2, x3) >
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P (x2 > x3|x2, x3, x4) or P (x3 > x2|x2, x3, x4) > P (x3 > x2|x1, x2, x3). So because
there are 3 such possible case, for SET 2 and SET 3 , SET 3 and SET 4. For each
of them we have two hypothesis testing and it makes 6 in total. The same logic for
the Attraction Effect follows.
And note that each number is represented by a letter in the survey sheets and
(1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12) are represented by (B, I, U, T, S¸, A, Y, S, D, O, R, I˙)
respectively for Figure 4.
4.2 Calibrating the Models and Comparing Them
4.2.1 Calibration
These models are calibrated using maximum likelihood principle. In this principle,
for each model we multiply the probabilities of each event and find the parameters
which make this multiplication maximum.
If pM is the set of parameters of model M, and Pr
M(pM )
i (jis, s) is the model’s
realized probability of j is being chosen by i, from set s with parameter set pM . We
used realized here which means we only take the realized choices into account. Then
the Maximum Likelihood Estimated parameters for model M can be obtained by,
arg maxpMΠi∈IΠs∈SΠj∈s
M(pM )
Pr
i
(jis, s)
We use MATLAB when making the maximum likelihood estimation, for MAT-
LAB code see Appendix 2.
4.2.2 Comparisons
When comparing different alternatives, we use 5 criteria. These are Aggregate-level
Prediction 1, Aggregate-level Prediction 2, Individual Level Prediction, Bayesian
Information Criteron, Akaike Information Criteron.
4.2.2.1 Aggragate-level Prediction 1. (ALP1)
This criterion is based on mean absolute deviations(MAD).
Where S is the set of the choice sets and s represents any element of that set, J
is the set of the objects and j represents any element of that set, I is the set of the
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subjects and i represents any element of that set, PrMi (j|s) is the probability that
model assigns to j being chosen from the set s by subject i, Rate(j|s) is the rate of
the subjects who choose j from the set S, (n|s) is the number of the subjects in the
choice set s, |S| is the number of the choice sets, |J |s| is the number of the objects
in the choice set s, and PrM is the probabilistic distribution which is described by
model M, in the choice set s the formulation of Aggragate-level Prediction 1 is:
ALP1M(S, J, I, PrM) = (
∑
s∈S
(
∑
j∈J
(|((
∑
i∈I
M
Pr
i
(j|s))x(n|s)−1)−Rate(j|s)|))x(|J |s|)−1)x(|S|)−1
and if |J |s| is equal for all s∈ S, then we can write,
(
∑
s∈S
(
∑
j∈J
(|((
∑
i∈I
M
Pr
i
(j|s))x(n|s)−1)−Rate(j|s)|)))x(|J |s|)−1x(|S|)−1
Example 5 Assuming there are only three people, say after calibrating the model
M, in choice set s1, the probability of being chosen for person 1,2,3 and for objects
x,y,z are (1/4,1/2,1/4); (1/6,1/3,1/2) and (3/8, 5/8, 0) respectively and n choice
set s2, the probability of being chosen for person 4,5,6 and for objects a,b,c are
(1/8,5/8,1/4); (1/3,1/2,1/6) and (1/4, 1/2, 1/4) respectively. So our model predicts
that x,y,z are chosen with probability (((1/4)+(1/6)+(3/8))x(1/3), ((1/2)+(1/3)+
(5/8))x(1/3), ((1/4) + (1/2) + (0))x(1/3)) = (0.263 89; 0.486 11; 0.25) respectively
and a,b,c are chosen with probability (((1/8)+(1/3)+(1/4))x(1/3), ((5/8)+(1/2)+
(1/2))x(1/3), ((1/4) + (1/6) + (1/4))x(1/3)) = (0.236 11; 0.541 67; 0.222 22)On the
other hand our observations are such that x,y,z and a,b,c are chosen by (10,15,25) and
(4,5,2) subjects respectively So MAD is (( |0.26389− 10/50| + |0.48611− 15/50| +
|0.25− 25/50| )+ (|0.23611− 4/11|+|0.54167− 5/11|+|0.22222− 2/11|)) /(3x2) =
0.125 84. For this criterion the smaller is the better.
4.2.2.2 Aggragate-level Prediction 2. (ALP2)
This criterion is based on mean squared deviations(MSD). The formula is almost
the same, but the square is used instead of absolute value function; if |J |s| is equal
for all s’s :
16
ALP2M(S, J, I, PrM) = (
∑
s∈S
(
∑
j∈J
(((
∑
i∈I
M
Pr
i
(j|s))x(n|s)−1)−Rate(j|s) )2))x(|J |s|)−1x(|S|)−1
For the example above it gives:
((((0.26389− 10/50)2 + (0.48611− 15/50)2 + (0.25− 25/50)2)/3) + (((0.23611−
4/11)2 + (0.54167− 5/11)2 + (0.22222− 2/11)2)/3))/2 = 2. 111 7× 10−2
For this criterion the smaller is the better.
Note that this criterion is not included in Kivetz, Netzer and Srinivasan’s (2004)
study. But as you see this criterion is very intuitive and resembles MAD.
4.2.2.3 Individual Level Prediction
It is just the maximized value of the likelihood function we calculated when we are
conducting Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimation. The larger is the better.
4.2.2.4 Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)
BIC is a criterion used when comparing competing models. Intuitively, a model
can be very explaining by adding more parameters and sample. So while we are
evaluating a model we take into account the individual level of prediction and the
number of parameters and sample size.
BICM = −2 ∗ ln(LM) + px ln(n)
where L is the maximized value of likelihood function. p is the number of parameters
included. n is the size of the sampling.
For this criterion the less is the better.
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4.2.2.5 Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
AICM = 2 ∗ p− 2x ln(LM)
Note that we are not interested in sample size for AIC. For this criterion the less
is the better.
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5 The Results of our Experiment
5.1 Existence Results
Our results indicate that for 9 cases, these effects are significant.
The z values for the tests for the Compromise Effect:
1. P (x2 > x3|x1, x2, x3) > P (x2 > x3|x2, x3, x4)→0.2485
2. P (x3 > x2|x2, x3, x4) > P (x3 > x2|x1, x2, x3)→1.8271
3. P (x3 > x4|x2, x3, x4) > P (x3 > x4|x3, x4, x5)→1.4193
4. P (x4 > x3|x3, x4, x5) > P (x4 > x3|x2, x3, x4)→1.5753
5. P (x4 > x5|x3, x4, x5) > P (x4 > x5|x4, x5, x6)→-0.3720
6. P (x5 > x4|x4, x5, x6) > P (x5 > x4|x3, x4, x5)→-0.3071
and for the Attraction Effect
1. P (x8 > x10|x7, x8, x10) > P (x8 > x10|x8, x9, x10)→0.4041
2. P (x10 > x12|x9, x10, x12) > P (x10 > x12|x10, x11, x12)→0.1718
3. P (x10 > x8|x8, x9, x10) > P (x10 > x8|x7, x8, x10)→1.2168
4. P (x12 > x10|x10, x11, x12) > P (x12 > x10|x9, x10, x12)→0.1945
So for all cases, the existence of these effects cannot be rejected.
Additionally there is a violation of WARP. P (x3 > x4|x2, x3, x4)) > P (x4 >
x3|x2, x3, x4) but P (x4 > x3|x3, x4, x5) > P (x3 > x4|x3, x4, x5). Because it is the
case in Compromise Effect the implication is that Compromise Effect may cause
violations of WARP This results do not show that the choices from trinary choice
sets in which the Attraction Effect prevails, WARP is not violated. The only thing
it can be seen that it is not detected for this particular cases.
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MODELS/PARAMETERS c1 c2 b
VMM - - 1
GCM 0.45 0.35 0.6
CCM 0.45 0.25 0.35
NCCM 0.5 0.05 0.05
5.2 Comparison of the Models
We calibrated the parameters below using Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Because we use MATLAB, we had to choose sensitivity at the expense of speed. For
this reason all of the results are at 0.05 sensitivity level.
MODEL/CRITERIA LL ALP1 ALP2 BIC AIC
VMM 0 0.1605 0.6157 60 2
GCM 1.0246 ∗e−54 0.0717 0.1184 180 6
CCM 5.8060∗e−53 0.0914 0.1933 180 6
NCCM 9.8024∗e−55 0.0831 0.1594 180 6
The table above represents the value of all criteria of each model. It indicates the
CCM performs better according to LL on the other hand, GCM have better results
of ALP1 and ALP2. And Lastly VMM performs better according to BIC and AIC
due to its superiority of having less parameter. Additionally, the numerical results
here is not alike with the study of Kivetzi Netzger and Srinivasan(2004), because
we did not normalize them to 100 or 1000. Their results can be seen below.
The results of Kivetz, Netzger and Srinivasan (2004) can be found below. For
parameters, the differences may stem from two different reasons. Firstly, while they
calibrated these models for only Compromise effect we did it for both of these effects.
The process of Maximum Likelihood Estimation is sensitive such changes which may
bring about such inconsistencies.
On the other hand the results below, which belong to the same research, indicate
two important results Firstly, NCCM outperformed other models but our model
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MODELS/PARAMETERS c1 c2 b
VMM Not Calibrated(NC) NC NC
GCM 0.8 0.7 0.1
CCM 0.45 0.35 0.4
NCCM 0.05 0.15 0.05
does not have such a result. The second and the interesting result is that, when
the Attraction Effect included, then these models are not as explaining as before.
However, the loss in the prediction power does not reduce dramatically.
MODEL/CRITERIA LL ALP1 ALP2 BIC AIC
VMM 960 11 NC 963 NC
GCM 965 10 NC 968 NC
CCM 938 6 NC 938 NC
NCCM 920 6 NC 927 NC
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6 Comments and Further Questions
This study has shown the validity of Compromise and Attraction Effects. Addition-
ally the possible violations of WARP are shown by survey data. Furthermore, the
models which may capture these effects are compared and it is shown that none of
them is superior to others. The concerns and future questions arisen with this study
are as follows.
We observe that some people make decision according to the marginal expendi-
ture. Especially, if the attributes are the size and the affordability, some agents finds
the money they pay per size and choose the cheapest. Even though this behavior
does not affect the validity of these effects for our setting and data set, in some cases
this concern may outweigh these effects.
Additionally, the Compromise and Attraction Effects are not the only framework
effects. Endowment Effect, for instance is an important framework effect. People
tend to overrate the value of the objects they have. Or sometimes some objects may
behave as reference point and it may affect the decision of the agents. I think these
both concerns, the marginal expenditure concern and the other framework effects
concerns also should be incorporated the models we use and see whether or not they
perform well.
Another concern is about the models we used. All the models we use have a
convex nature. So combining all concerns the question is: Is it possible to find a
better model to explain these effects? A model which has a weaker convex nature
incorperated with other framework effects would help us to have better predictions.
The last concern we touch upon is the case dependence. Case dependence is
the problem of generalization of basic principles. For instance the choice of the
kind of the object may change the validity of the effect. Or the choice of the sizes.
Say the object would be a spoon and the size is the perimeter of the spoon. Even
though the normal-sized spoon we use is the extreme or Pareto worse one, the agents
would choose that one. Or if the prices of the spoons were 100 dollar, 400 dollar,
500 dollar, most people would choose the 100 dollar spoon regardless from the size.
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A study focusing on this problem would be a nice starting point to have a better
understanding of the choices of people.
The practical implications of the Compromise and Attraction Effect are worth
considering. Both of these models can be used product positioning. If producing
an object has smaller marginal cost then the firms would create a positioning such
that that object is the intermediate or the Pareto better object. This is particularly
true for the objects which has not many attributes or have many attributes but the
users able to evaluate only two of them. Sometimes, rather than producing three
objects which is positioned according to these effects, firms may position their own
product in a way that their product is the intermediate or Pareto better object of
the market.
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Figure 1: Menu of Cafe de Compromise.
Figure 2: Menu of Cafe de Attraction.
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Figure 3: Depiction of Compromise and Attraction Effects.
Figure 4: The Choice Sets Applied to Subjects.
25
7 Appendix 1: The Survey Sheets
26




8 Appendix 2: The MATLAB Code
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xlsread ('F.xls');
F=ans;    % open the matrix which shows that which person is a member of which group.
xlsread ('U.xls');
U=ans;    % open the matrix which shows that what is the rank of the alternatives among 
          % other alternatives for each attribute.
xlsread ('exK1K2.xls');
K1K2=ans;  % open the matrix which shows the answer to fifth question for each person.
xlsread ('exK1.xls');
K1=ans;% open the matrix which shows the answer to first question for each person.
xlsread ('exK2.xls');
K2=ans;% open the matrix which shows the answer to second question for each person.
xlsread ('C1C2.xls');
C1C2=ans;;% open the matrix which shows the answers to the third and forth questions 
for each person.
xlsread ('FU.xls');
FU=ans;;% open the matrix which shows that which alternatives are included in each 
choice set.
xlsread ('exS.xls');
S=ans;;;% open the matrix which shows the answers to the third and forth questions 
        % for each person in another way
 
        
        
        
        
  
  
  
 
 
 
%------------CALIBRATION----------------------
 
sens=20;     %sensitivity  
e=exp(1) ;   % define number e
 
 
for i=1:sens
    c1(i)=i/sens;    % we produce numbers between 0 and 1 for each parameter.
                     % We may increase the sensitivity and 
                     % the the scale but it will increase complexity. 0 and 1 
                     % is not arbitrary, I have taken them from previous
                     % work.
end
 
c2=c1   ;   %  c1 c2 and b are the parameters to be calibrated.
b=c2     ;
 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
% Now we produce partworth values and
 
for i=1:size(K1,1)
    for j=1:size(U,2)
        for k=1:2
            if k==1
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                PIJK(i,j,k)=K1(i,U(k,j))* K1K2(i,1) ; %parthworh values
               
            else
              
                PIJK(i,j,k)=K2(i,U(k,j))* K1K2(i,2); 
            end
        end
    end
end
 
 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
PIKSMIN=1000*ones(size(K1,1),2,8);  %startup values for P i,min,s
PIKSMAX=-1000*zeros(size(K1,1),2,8); %startup values for P,i,max,s
 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
 
for i=1:size(K1,1)
    for k=1:2
        for s=1:8
               if S(i,s)~=0   % if choice set s is asked to the subject i. 
                  
                   for j=1:12
                       if FU(s,j)==1   % if choice set s includes good j.
                           if PIJK(i,j,k)< PIKSMIN(i,k,s)   
                               PIKSMIN(i,k,s)=PIJK(i,j,k);
                           end  
                               
                            if PIJK(i,j,k)> PIKSMAX(i,k,s)  
                               PIKSMAX(i,k,s)=PIJK(i,j,k);
                            end
                              
                           
                           
                       end
                   end
               end
        end
    end
end
 
 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
CCMMIJS=zeros(size(K1,1),12,8,sens,sens); 
%   startup value for MIJS for CCM. 
CCMEBEMIJS=zeros(size(K1,1),12,8,sens,sens,sens);
%   startup value for e to the power MIJS for CCM.
CCMPAYDA=zeros(size(K1,1),12,sens,sens,sens);
% startup value for the denominator of the probability function for CCM
CCMPROP=zeros(size(K1,1),12,8,sens,sens,sens);
% startup value for probability function for  CCM.
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CCMMLE=ones(sens,sens,sens);
% startup value for maximim likelihood function for CCM.
 
 
%-------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
GCMMIJS=zeros(size(K1,1),12,8,sens,sens); 
GCMEBEMIJS=zeros(size(K1,1),12,8,sens,sens,sens);
GCMPAYDA=zeros(size(K1,1),12,sens,sens,sens); 
GCMPROP=zeros(size(K1,1),12,8,sens,sens,sens);
GCMMLE=ones(sens,sens,sens);
 
 
%--------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
VMMMIJS=zeros(size(K1,1),12,8); 
VMMEBEMIJS=zeros(size(K1,1),12,8,sens);
VMMPAYDA=zeros(size(K1,1),12,sens); 
VMMPROP=zeros(size(K1,1),12,8,sens);
VMMMLE=ones(1,sens);
 
 
%--------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
 
NCCMMIJS=zeros(size(K1,1),12,8,sens,sens);  
NCCMEBEMIJS=zeros(size(K1,1),12,8,sens,sens,sens);
NCCMPAYDA=zeros(size(K1,1),12,sens,sens,sens); 
NCCMPROP=zeros(size(K1,1),12,8,sens,sens,sens);
NCCMMLE=ones(sens,sens,sens);
 
 
%-------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
POPULATION=zeros(1,8); % startup value for the matrix which shows
%how many people answered for each choice set.
 
%-------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
PAYRATE=zeros(12,8);
%start up value for the number of the people choosing an alternative from that choice 
set
 
RATE=zeros(12,8);  
%start up value for the rate of the people choosing an alternative from that choice set
 
 
%-------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
counter1=size(K1,1)*2*3*sens*sens*sens;
counter2=counter1;
        %counters to track the process.
%-------------------------------------------------------------------------
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          % We now calculate the values which is used in the formule of
          % each model.ap
 
for i=1:size(K1,1)
   
    for s=1:8
        if S(i,s)~=0  % if choice set s is asked to the subject i. 
            
                          POPULATION(s)=POPULATION(s)+1 ; 
                          PAYRATE(S(i,s),s)=PAYRATE(S(i,s),s)+1; 
            
                         
            
                for j=1:12
        
                          RATE(j,s)=PAYRATE(j,s)/POPULATION(s);
                    
                  if FU(s,j)==1   % if choice set s includes good j.
                            
                      
                      for cone=1:sens
                      for ctwo=1:sens
                          for be=1:sens
                                           
                                      
                                            
                                         %---------------------------------
                                         
CCMMIJS(i,j,s,cone,ctwo)= ((PIJK(i,j,1)-PIKSMIN(i,1,s))^c1(cone))+((PIJK(i,j,2)-PIKSMIN
(i,2,s))^c2(ctwo));
CCMEBEMIJS(i,j,s,cone,ctwo,be)= e^(b(be)*CCMMIJS(i,j,s,cone,ctwo));
CCMPAYDA(i,s,cone,ctwo,be)=CCMPAYDA(i,s,cone,ctwo,be)+CCMEBEMIJS(i,j,s,cone,ctwo,be);
                                      
                                         %---------------------------------
                                         
GCMMIJS(i,j,s,cone,ctwo)=(PIJK(i,j,1)^c1(cone))+(PIJK(i,j,2)^c2(ctwo));
GCMEBEMIJS(i,j,s,cone,ctwo,be)= e^(b(be)*GCMMIJS(i,j,s,cone,ctwo));
GCMPAYDA(i,s,cone,ctwo,be)=GCMPAYDA(i,s,cone,ctwo,be)+GCMEBEMIJS(i,j,s,cone,ctwo,be);
                          
                                         %---------------------------------
                                         
VMMMIJS(i,j,s)=PIJK(i,j,1)+PIJK(i,j,2);
VMMEBEMIJS(i,j,s,be)= e^(b(be)*VMMMIJS(i,j,s));
VMMPAYDA(i,s,be)=(VMMPAYDA(i,s,be)+VMMEBEMIJS(i,j,s,be));
                          
                                        %---------------------------------
                                        
NCCMMIJS(i,j,s,cone,ctwo)= (((PIKSMAX(i,1,s)-PIKSMIN(i,1,s))^(1-c1(cone))) * ((PIJK(i,
j,1)-PIKSMIN(i,1,s))^c1(cone))) + (((PIKSMAX(i,2,s)-PIKSMIN(i,2,s))^(1-c2(ctwo))) * 
((PIJK(i,j,2)-PIKSMIN(i,2,s))^c2(ctwo)));
NCCMEBEMIJS(i,j,s,cone,ctwo,be)= e^(b(be)*NCCMMIJS(i,j,s,cone,ctwo));
NCCMPAYDA(i,s,cone,ctwo,be)=NCCMPAYDA(i,s,cone,ctwo,be)+NCCMEBEMIJS(i,j,s,cone,ctwo,
be);
                                         
                                         %---------------------------------
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counter1=counter1-1
                                         
                                         %---------------------------------
                                   
                                        
                                         
                          end
                        
               
                      end
                      end 
                      
                  end
               
                 end
          end
    end
end
 
VMMPAYDA=VMMPAYDA/(sens*sens);   %'t was overcounted
 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
       % Now we find the probability values for each model and for each
       % parameter set.
 
for i=1:size(K1,1)
   
    for s=1:8
        if S(i,s)~=0  % if choice set s is asked to the subject i. 
            
                for j=1:12
      
                  if FU(s,j)==1   % if choice set s includes good j.  
                      
                      for cone=1:sens
                      for ctwo=1:sens
                          for be=1:sens
                    
                      
CCMPROP(i,j,s,cone,ctwo,be)= CCMEBEMIJS(i,j,s,cone,ctwo,be)/CCMPAYDA(i,s,cone,ctwo,be);
                                         
                                         
                                         %---------------------------------
                                        
GCMPROP(i,j,s,cone,ctwo,be)= GCMEBEMIJS(i,j,s,cone,ctwo,be)/GCMPAYDA(i,s,cone,ctwo,be);
                                         
                                         %---------------------------------
                                         
                                         
VMMPROP(i,j,s,be)= VMMEBEMIJS(i,j,s,be)/VMMPAYDA(i,s,be);
                                         
                                         %---------------------------------
                                        
NCCMPROP(i,j,s,cone,ctwo,be)= NCCMEBEMIJS(i,j,s,cone,ctwo,be)/NCCMPAYDA(i,s,cone,ctwo,
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be);
                                        
                                         %---------------------------------
                                         
counter2=counter2-1
                               
                                         %---------------------------------
                          
                          end
               
                      end
                      end 
                      
                  end
               
                 end
          end
    end
end
 
 
 
%-----------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
   % We calculate likelihood values for each parameter set.
 
for i=1:size(K1,1)
     for s=1:8
        if S(i,s)~=0 
            for cone=1:sens
                      for ctwo=1:sens
                          for be=1:sens
                    
            
                         CCMMLE(cone,ctwo,be)=CCMMLE(cone,ctwo,be)* CCMPROP(i,S(i,s),s,
cone,ctwo,be);
                         
                         
                         %------------------------------------------------
                         GCMMLE(cone,ctwo,be)=GCMMLE(cone,ctwo,be)* GCMPROP(i,S(i,s),s,
cone,ctwo,be);
                         
                         %------------------------------------------------
                         
                         VMMMLE(be)=VMMMLE(be)* VMMPROP(i,S(i,s),s,be);
                         
                         %-------------------------------------------------
                         
                         NCCMMLE(cone,ctwo,be)=NCCMMLE(cone,ctwo,be)* NCCMPROP(i,S(i,
s),s,cone,ctwo,be);
                         
                         %------------------------------------------------
                         
                          end
                      end
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            end
            
        end
     end
end
 
 
 
%-------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
CCMMLC1=-1; %startup values for each parameter for CCM.
CCMMLC2=-1;
CCMMLB=-1;
CCMcounter=0;%this is the counter for the number ofparameter sets at which
%likelihood value is maximized.
 
 
CCMLL=max(max(max(CCMMLE))) % the maximized likelihood value of CCM.
 
 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
GCMMLC1=-1;
GCMMLC2=-1;
GCMMLB=-1;
GCMcounter=0;
 
GCMLL=max(max(max(GCMMLE)))
 
%-----------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
VMMMLB=-1;
VMMcounter=0;
 
VMMLL=max(max(max(VMMMLE)))
 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
NCCMMLC1=-1;
NCCMMLC2=-1;
NCCMMLB=-1;
NCCMcounter=0;
 
NCCMLL=max(max(max(NCCMMLE))) 
 
 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
       %now we find the parameters of maximized likelihood value.
 
for cone=1:sens 
for ctwo=1:sens
for be=1:sens
    
           %---------------------------------------------------------------
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            if CCMMLE(cone,ctwo,be)==CCMLL
                CCMMLC1=cone
                CCMMLC2=ctwo
                CCMMLB=be
                CCMcounter=CCMcounter+1
            end
                     
            
            %-------------------------------------------------------------
            
            if GCMMLE(cone,ctwo,be)==GCMLL
                GCMMLC1=cone
                GCMMLC2=ctwo
                GCMMLB=be
                GCMcounter=GCMcounter+1
            end
            
            %-------------------------------------------------------------
            
              if VMMMLE(be)==VMMLL
                VMMMLB=be
                VMMcounter=VMMcounter+1
              end
            
            %-------------------------------------------------------------
            
            if NCCMMLE(cone,ctwo,be)==NCCMLL
                NCCMMLC1=cone
                NCCMMLC2=ctwo
                NCCMMLB=be
                NCCMcounter=NCCMcounter+1
            end
                     
            
            %--------------------------------------------------------------
            
end
end
end
 
CALIBPARAMETERSVMM=VMMMLB;%calibrated parameters
CALIBPARAMETERSGCM=[GCMMLC1 GCMMLC2 GCMMLB];
CALIBPARAMETERSCCM=[CCMMLC1 CCMMLC2 CCMMLB];
CALIBPARAMETERSNCCM=[NCCMMLC1 NCCMMLC2 NCCMMLB];
 
 
LL=[VMMLL GCMLL CCMLL NCCMLL];  %maximized likelihood value
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%-------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
         % The probabilities after calibration for each model.      
 
for i=1:size(K1,1)
     for s=1:8
        if S(i,s)~=0 
            for j=1:12
                    
            
                         PROPCCM(i,j,s)= CCMPROP(i,j,s,CCMMLC1,CCMMLC2,CCMMLB);
                         
                         %------------------------------------------------
                       
                         PROPGCM(i,j,s)= GCMPROP(i,j,s,GCMMLC1,GCMMLC2,GCMMLB);
                         
                         %------------------------------------------------
                         
                         PROPVMM(i,j,s)= VMMPROP(i,j,s,VMMMLB);
                         
                         %-------------------------------------------------
                         
                         PROPNCCM(i,j,s)= NCCMPROP(i,j,s,NCCMMLC1,NCCMMLC2,NCCMMLB);
                         
                         %------------------------------------------------
            end
                         
            
        end
     end
end
 
%-------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
    %we now calculate ALP1 and ALP values for each model.
    
CALIBRATECCM=sum(PROPCCM,1)*(1/3);
 
CALIBRATEGCM=sum(PROPGCM,1)*(1/3);
 
CALIBRATEVMM=sum(PROPVMM,1)*(1/3);
 
CALIBRATENCCM=sum(PROPNCCM,1)*(1/3);
 
 
 
ALP1CCM=0;
ALP1GCM=0;
ALP1VMM=0;
ALP1NCCM=0;
 
ALP2CCM=0;
ALP2GCM=0;
ALP2VMM=0;
ALP2NCCM=0;
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     for s=1:8
            for j=1:12
                    
            
                ALP1CCM=(ALP1CCM+abs(CALIBRATECCM(1,j,s)-RATE(j,s)))/24;
                
                ALP1GCM=(ALP1GCM+abs(CALIBRATEGCM(1,j,s)-RATE(j,s)))/24;
                
                ALP1VMM=(ALP1VMM+abs(CALIBRATEVMM(1,j,s)-RATE(j,s)))/24;
                
                ALP1NCCM=(ALP1NCCM+abs(CALIBRATENCCM(1,j,s)-RATE(j,s)))/24;
                
                
                
                
                ALP2CCM=(ALP2CCM+(CALIBRATECCM(1,j,s)-RATE(j,s) ).^2)/24;
                
                ALP2GCM=(ALP2GCM+(CALIBRATEGCM(1,j,s)-RATE(j,s)).^2)/24;
                
                ALP2VMM=(ALP2VMM+(CALIBRATEVMM(1,j,s)-RATE(j,s)).^2)/24;
                
                ALP2NCCM=(ALP2NCCM+(CALIBRATENCCM(1,j,s)-RATE(j,s)).^2)/24;
                
                
                
                
            end
     end
 
 
ALP1=[ALP1VMM ALP1GCM ALP1CCM ALP1NCCM];
ALP2=[ALP2VMM ALP2GCM ALP2CCM ALP2NCCM];
     
     
%-------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
     %Bayesian Information Criteron
 
BICCCM=  (-2*CCMLL)+3*(size(K1,1)) ; % sample s'ze 12 m' 24 mu
BICGCM=  (-2*GCMLL)+3*(size(K1,1)) ;
BICVMM=  (-2*VMMLL)+(size(K1,1)) ;
BICNCCM= (-2*NCCMLL)+3*(size(K1,1)) ;
 
BIC=[BICVMM BICGCM BICCCM BICNCCM];
%----------------------------------------------------------------------
 
      %Akeike Information Criteron
      
AICCCM=  (-2*CCMLL)+3*2; 
AICGCM=  (-2*GCMLL)+3*2 ;
AICVMM=  (-2*VMMLL)+2 ;
AICNCCM= (-2*NCCMLL)+3*2 ;
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AIC=[AICVMM AICGCM AICCCM  AICNCCM];
 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
 
 
        
        
%-----------------------EXISTENCE-----------------------------
  % we test the existence of the compromise and attraction effect.
  
  % we test P1(2,3)>P4(2,3)       H1
  %         P4(3,2)>P1(3,2)       H2
  %         P2(3,4)>P5(3,4)       H3
  %         P5(4,3)>P2(4,3)       H4
  %         P3(4,5)>P6(4,5)       H5
  %         P6(5,4)>P3(5,4)       H6
  %                                    for the compromise effect
  
  %we test P7(8,10)>P9(8,10)      H7
  %        P9(10,12)>P11(10,12)   H8
  %        P9(10,8)> P7(10,8)     H9
  %        P11(12,10)> P9(12,10)  H10 
  %                                             for attraction effect
  
  %H1 H2.. are the tests/
  
  
  P123=RATE(2,1)/(RATE(3,1)+RATE(2,1)); %these are the p's in the formula.
  P423=RATE(2,2)/(RATE(3,2)+RATE(2,2));
  P432=RATE(3,2)/(RATE(2,2)+RATE(3,2));
  P132=RATE(3,1)/(RATE(2,1)+RATE(3,1));
  P234=RATE(3,2)/(RATE(3,2)+RATE(4,2));
  P534=RATE(3,3)/(RATE(3,3)+RATE(4,3));
  P543=RATE(4,3)/(RATE(4,3)+RATE(3,3));
  P243=RATE(4,2)/(RATE(4,2)+RATE(3,2));
  P345=RATE(4,3)/(RATE(5,3)+RATE(4,3));
  P645=RATE(4,4)/(RATE(5,4)+RATE(4,4));
  P654=RATE(5,4)/(RATE(4,4)+RATE(5,4));
  P354=RATE(5,3)/(RATE(4,3)+RATE(5,3));
  P7810=RATE(8,5)/(RATE(8,5)+RATE(10,5));
  P9810=RATE(8,6)/(RATE(8,6)+RATE(10,6));
  P91012=RATE(10,7)/(RATE(10,7)+RATE(12,7));
  P111012=RATE(10,8)/(RATE(10,8)+RATE(12,8));
  P9108=RATE(10,6)/(RATE(10,6)+RATE(8,6));
  P7108=RATE(10,5)/(RATE(10,5)+RATE(8,5));
  P111210=RATE(12,8)/(RATE(12,8)+RATE(10,8));
  P91210=RATE(12,7)/(RATE(12,7)+RATE(10,7));
 
  
  %let us find pooled proportions
  
  
  PoolH1=(P123*RATE(2,1)*POPULATION(1)+P423*RATE(2,2)*POPULATION(2))/(RATE(2,1)
*POPULATION(1)+RATE(2,2)*POPULATION(2));
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  PoolH2=(P432*RATE(3,2)*POPULATION(2)+P123*RATE(3,1)*POPULATION(1))/(RATE(3,2)
*POPULATION(2)+RATE(3,1)*POPULATION(1));
  PoolH3=(P234*RATE(3,2)*POPULATION(2)+P534*RATE(3,3)*POPULATION(3))/(RATE(3,2)
*POPULATION(2)+RATE(3,3)*POPULATION(3));
  PoolH4=(P543*RATE(4,3)*POPULATION(3)+P243*RATE(4,2)*POPULATION(2))/(RATE(4,3)
*POPULATION(3)+RATE(4,2)*POPULATION(2));
  PoolH5=(P345*RATE(4,3)*POPULATION(3)+P645*RATE(4,4)*POPULATION(4))/(RATE(4,3)
*POPULATION(3)+RATE(4,4)*POPULATION(4));
  PoolH6=(P654*RATE(5,4)*POPULATION(4)+P354*RATE(5,3)*POPULATION(3))/(RATE(5,4)
*POPULATION(4)+RATE(5,3)*POPULATION(3));
  PoolH7=(P7810*RATE(8,5)*POPULATION(5)+P9810*RATE(8,6)*POPULATION(6))/(RATE(8,5)
*POPULATION(5)+RATE(8,6)*POPULATION(6));
  PoolH8=(P91012*RATE(10,7)*POPULATION(7)+P111012*RATE(10,8)*POPULATION(8))/(RATE(10,7)
*POPULATION(7)+RATE(10,8)*POPULATION(8));
  PoolH9=(P9108*RATE(10,6)*POPULATION(6)+P7108*RATE(10,5)*POPULATION(5))/(RATE(10,6)
*POPULATION(6)+RATE(10,5)*POPULATION(5));
  PoolH10=(P111210*RATE(12,8)*POPULATION(8)+P91210*RATE(12,7)*POPULATION(7))/(RATE
(12,8)*POPULATION(8)+RATE(12,7)*POPULATION(7));
  
  
  
  
  
  % now we calculate the standard error.
  
  
  SEH1=sqrt(PoolH1*(1-PoolH1)*((RATE(2,1)*POPULATION(1))^-1+(RATE(2,2)*POPULATION(2))^-
1));
  SEH2=sqrt(PoolH2*(1-PoolH2)*((RATE(3,2)*POPULATION(2))^-1+(RATE(3,1)*POPULATION(1))^-
1));
  SEH3=sqrt(PoolH3*(1-PoolH3)*((RATE(3,2)*POPULATION(2))^-1+(RATE(3,3)*POPULATION(3))^-
1));                                                   
  SEH4=sqrt(PoolH4*(1-PoolH4)*((RATE(4,3)*POPULATION(3))^-1+(RATE(4,2)*POPULATION(2))^-
1));
  SEH5=sqrt(PoolH5*(1-PoolH5)*((RATE(4,3)*POPULATION(3))^-1+(RATE(4,4)*POPULATION(4))^-
1));
  SEH6=sqrt(PoolH6*(1-PoolH6)*((RATE(5,4)*POPULATION(4))^-1+(RATE(5,3)*POPULATION(3))^-
1));
  SEH7=sqrt(PoolH7*(1-PoolH7)*((RATE(8,5)*POPULATION(5))^-1+(RATE(8,6)*POPULATION(6))^-
1));
  SEH8=sqrt(PoolH8*(1-PoolH8)*((RATE(10,7)*POPULATION(7))^-1+(RATE(10,8)*POPULATION(8))
^-1));
  SEH9=sqrt(PoolH9*(1-PoolH9)*((RATE(10,6)*POPULATION(6))^-1+(RATE(10,5)*POPULATION(5))
^-1));
  SEH10=sqrt(PoolH10*(1-PoolH10)*((RATE(12,8)*POPULATION(8))^-1+(RATE(12,7)*POPULATION
(7))^-1));
  
  
  
  %now we compute the z=statistics for every test. 
  
  zH1= (P123-P423)/SEH1;
  zH2= (P432-P123)/SEH2;
  zH3= (P234-P534)/SEH3;
  zH4= (P543-P243)/SEH4;
  zH5= (P345-P645)/SEH5;
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  zH6= (P654-P354)/SEH6;
  zH7= (P7810-P9810)/SEH7;
  zH8= (P91012-P111012)/SEH8;
  zH9= (P9108-P7108)/SEH9;
  zH10= (P111210-P91210)/SEH10;
 
  z=[sign(zH1+2.326) sign(zH2+2.326) sign(zH3+2.326) sign(zH4+2.326) sign(zH5+2.326) 
sign(zH6+2.326) sign(zH7+2.326) sign(zH8+2.326) sign(zH9+2.326) sign(zH10+2.326)];
  
  % according to the normal distribution table the ones which has a
  %larger value than -2.326 will make us to accept the null hypothesis, the
  %existence of these effect   the positive numbers indicate the existence
  %of these effects
  
  
  %------------------Violations of WARP---------------------------------
  
  
 
  
  WARP23= sign(P123-P132)*sign(P423-P432);
  WARP34= sign(P234-P243)*sign(P534-P543);
  WARP45= sign(P345-P354)*sign(P645-P654);
 
  
  WARP810=sign(P7810-P7108)*sign(P9810-P9108);
  WARP1012=sign(P91012-P91210)*sign(P111012-P111210);
  
      % negative signs indicate a violation.
      
WARP=[WARP23 WARP34 WARP45 WARP810 WARP1012];
      
     
 
 
      
 %----------------------DISPLAY OF RESULTS-----------------------------
 
  
 z
  
 
 
  
CALIBPARAMETERSVMM
CALIBPARAMETERSGCM
CALIBPARAMETERSCCM
CALIBPARAMETERSNCCM
 
LL
 
ALP1
 
ALP2
 
BIC
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